In the philosophy of language and linguistics, implicature refers to meaning that is communicated indirectly rather than explicitly stated. The concept was formally introduced by H. Paul Grice in 1967 to distinguish between what is literally said (semantic content) and what is inferred by the listener (pragmatic content). Unlike logical entailment, implicatures are context-dependent, cancellable, and non-detachable.
Grice's theory fundamentally reshaped modern pragmatics by demonstrating that human communication relies heavily on cooperative inference. To systematize these phenomena, implicatures are broadly classified into two main categories: conversational and conventional, with further subdivisions based on contextual dependency.
Conversational Implicature
Conversational implicatures arise from the assumption that speakers adhere to (or deliberately flout) the Cooperative Principle and its four maxims: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. When a speaker appears to violate a maxim, listeners infer an alternative meaning to restore cooperation.
Example: "The professor said, 'The cafeteria serves food.'"
Implicature: The food is not particularly good.
Mechanism: Violation of Maxim of Quantity (under-informative) triggers a negative inference.
Conversational implicatures are further divided into two subtypes based on how much they rely on situational context.
Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI)
GCIs are context-independent inferences that hold across most typical conversational settings. They are triggered by the inherent meaning of certain words or structures, particularly scalar items like some, or, and.
Example: "I ate some of the cookies."
Implicature: I did not eat all of them.
Note: This inference survives in neutral contexts. It can only be cancelled if context overrides it (e.g., "I ate some, and actually, all of them!").
GCIs are defeasible but highly stable. They are central to the study of scalar implicatures, where weaker terms on a semantic scale (some vs. all) automatically trigger upper-bound inferences.
Particularized Conversational Implicature (PCI)
PCIs are strictly context-dependent. They cannot be derived from the sentence alone and require specific situational knowledge shared by the interlocutors. Without the relevant context, the implicature fails to arise.
Context: A parent asks a child, "Did you clean your room?" The child replies, "I finished my homework."
Implicature: The room was not cleaned.
Mechanism: Violation of Maxim of Relation. The answer seems irrelevant unless it implies a negation of the question.
PCIs are common in literature, diplomacy, and everyday evasion tactics. They are highly cancellable and entirely reliant on pragmatic reasoning rather than lexical triggers.
Conventional Implicature
Conventional implicatures are lexically anchored. They are attached to specific words or phrases regardless of context or conversational maxims. Unlike conversational implicatures, they cannot be cancelled, do not arise from maxims, and contribute to meaning without affecting truth conditions.
Example: "She is poor but honest."
Implicature: There is a contrast or unexpected relationship between being poor and being honest.
Note: Replacing "but" with "and" preserves truth conditions but loses the conventional contrast implication.
Common carriers of conventional implicature include: but, yet, even, therefore, so, although, unless. These items carry a stable pragmatic contribution that speakers conventionally associate with them over time.
Key Differences
| Feature | Conversational Implicature | Conventional Implicature |
|---|---|---|
| Source | Context & Maxim violations | Lexical items (e.g., "but", "even") |
| Context Dependence | High (especially PCIs) | None (inherent to word meaning) |
| Cancellable? | Yes ("...and in fact, all") | No |
| Affects Truth Conditions? | No | No |
| Derivable from Logic? | No (requires pragmatic reasoning) | No (conventional association) |
References & Further Reading
- Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). Academic Press.
- Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
- Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press.
- Horn, L. R. (1984). Toward a New Taxonomy for Pragmatic Inference: Q-Based and R-Based Implicature. In Meaning, Form, and Use in Context (pp. 11–42). Georgetown University.
- Atlas, J. D. (2005). Externalism, Internalism, and Gricean Pragmatics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(1), 40–64.