Encryption Standards & Cryptographic Policy
Authoritative cryptographic guidelines, algorithm selections, key management protocols, and compliance frameworks mandated across all 400+ Aevum Zenth subsidiaries and external partner integrations.
1. Overview & Scope
Aevum Zenth operates a zero-trust security architecture across 62 countries. All data at rest, in transit, and in use must adhere to this cryptographic baseline. Deviations require written approval from the Office of the Chief Information Security Officer (OCISO) and must be logged in the central KMS audit trail.
This standard applies to:
- Core corporate infrastructure and cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP, Zenth Private Cloud)
- All subsidiary networks, including aerospace, healthcare, energy, and financial divisions
- Third-party vendor integrations and API gateways
- Edge devices, IoT telemetry streams, and autonomous systems
2. Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
Only NIST-approved and industry-validated algorithms are permitted. Legacy ciphers (DES, RC4, MD5, SHA-1, RSA < 2048) are strictly prohibited.
| Category | Primary Standard | Fallback/Alternative | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Symmetric Encryption | AES-256-GCM | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | Data at rest, database encryption, file storage |
| Asymmetric Encryption | RSA-4096 / ECDSA P-384 | X25519 (ECDH) | Key exchange, digital signatures, PKI |
| Hashing | SHA-256 / SHA-3 | BLAKE3 (performance-critical) | Integrity verification, password hashing (via Argon2id) |
| Key Derivation | HKDF-SHA256 | Argon2id (mem: 64MB, t: 3, p: 4) | Session keys, password hashing, PBKDF2 replacement |
| Transport Layer | TLS 1.3 (mandatory) | MTLS with certificate pinning | All network communications, API traffic, web services |
allowed_ciphers = [ "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" ] min_protocol_version = "TLSv1.3" cert_pin_enforcement = true ocsp_stapling = required
3. Data Classification & Encryption Tiers
Encryption strength is dictated by data sensitivity. All assets must be tagged with a classification level upon creation.
| Tier | Classification | Encryption Requirement | Access Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | Public | None required (TLS for transit) | Open / Authenticated |
| T2 | Internal | AES-128-GCM or equivalent | RBAC, SSO required |
| T3 | Confidential | AES-256-GCM, envelope encryption | RBAC + MFA, audit logging |
| T4 | Restricted | AES-256-GCM + hardware-backed KEK | ABAC, dual-control, session recording |
| T5 | Critical / Crown Jewels | Quantum-resistant hybrid + air-gapped HSM | Break-glass, cryptographic signing, zero-knowledge verification |
4. Key Management Infrastructure (KMI)
Key lifecycle management is centralized under Aevum Zenth KMS. Decentralized key generation is prohibited without OCISO authorization.
4.1 Hardware Security Modules
All T3βT5 encryption keys must be generated and stored in FIPS 140-3 Level 3 or higher certified HSMs. Approved vendors include YubiHSM 2, AWS CloudHSM, Azure Dedicated HSM, and Thales Luna 7.
4.2 Envelope Encryption Pattern
For high-volume data encryption, implement envelope encryption to balance performance and security:
- Generate a data encryption key (DEK) locally in memory
- Encrypt the DEK using a key encryption key (KEK) stored in HSM/KMS
- Store encrypted DEK alongside ciphertext
- Decrypt DEK on-demand via KMS API; never persist plaintext DEK to disk
// 1. Generate ephemeral DEK
dek = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))
// 2. Encrypt DEK with KEK from HSM
encrypted_dek = KMS.encrypt(kek_id, dek)
// 3. Encrypt payload
ct = AES_GCM.encrypt(dk, plaintext, aad)
// 4. Store: { ct, encrypted_dek, algorithm, iv, tag }
// 5. On read: dek = KMS.decrypt(kek_id, encrypted_dek) -> AES_GCM.decrypt(dk, ct)
5. Compliance & Certifications
Aevum Zenth's cryptographic implementation is validated against international standards and regulatory frameworks.
6. Implementation Guidelines
Engineering teams must follow these directives when integrating cryptographic primitives into new or legacy systems:
- Never roll your own crypto. Use vetted libraries only: OpenSSL 3.x+, Bouncy Castle, libsodium, or cloud provider KMS/Keyless APIs.
- Enforce TLS 1.3 across all internal and external endpoints. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 are preferred.
- Validate authenticity using detached signatures or authenticated encryption (AEAD). Never use ECB or CBC without proper padding oracle protections.
- Secure enclaves: Leverage AWS Nitro Enclaves, Azure confidential computing, or Intel SGX/AMD SEV for in-use encryption where applicable.
- API Security: All REST/gRPC endpoints must implement mutual TLS (mTLS) or OAuth 2.0 / OIDC with DPoP proof tokens.
7. Key Rotation & Incident Response
7.1 Rotation Policy
- Symmetric DEKs: Rotate every 90 days or after 10,000 encrypt/decrypt operations
- Asymmetric KEKs: Rotate annually or upon compromise suspicion
- TLS Certificates: Valid for maximum 90 days. Automated via ACME/Let's Encrypt or internal PKI
- Session Keys: Destroyed upon connection termination or user logout
7.2 Incident Response Protocols
In the event of suspected key compromise or cryptographic weakness discovery:
- Isolate affected systems immediately via network segmentation
- Revoke compromised keys in KMS and distribute CRL/OCSP updates
- Generate fresh KEK/DEK pairs using approved RNGs
- Re-encrypt affected datasets using the new KEK
- File an incident report with OCISO and initiate forensic audit